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The following essay is adapted from
"A Visiting Scholar Considers The Law
and the Humanities," which appeared in
The Key Reporter of Phi Beta Kappa
in summer 1998 as a partial report of
the author's year as a Phi Beta Kappa
Visiting Scholar. The selection here is a
summary of a lecture the author
delivered during his travels to eight
colleges and universities throughout the
United States. A more complete version
will appear in From Expectation to
Experience: Essays on Law and Legal
Education, a collection of the author's

essays being published this year by the
University of Michigan Press.
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BY }AMES BOYD WHITE

~ e t us begin by considering three
fragments of works that would be the
object of study in the humanities: a piece
of Emily Dickinson's famous poem,
"Because I could not stop for Death"; the
pair of scales in the well-known painting
by Vermeer at the National Gallery in
Washington, D.C., in which a woman
stands at a table on which gold coins are
scattered, holding those scales pensively in
her hand; and the location of the door in
the chapel at Ronchamp by Le Corbusier,

which is atypically on the south side of the
church rather than at the west end. With
these I compare a quotation from Brown v.
Board of Education. The question is: What
connections can be drawn among these
various items, or between what we do
when we study and respond to the first set
of items and what we do when we study
and respond to the last?
let us start with the first set, trying to
work out what it is that humanists typically
do; then we can tum to the activities of the
law, which at first seem utterly different but
which in the end reveal surprising
similarities.
The first and most important
characteristic of humanistic work is that it
focuses on a text or other artifact made by
others, in other cultural circumstances, and
usually in the past. The distinctive concern
of the humanist is with the meaning of the
artifact we examine - that is, its meaning
to the maker and the original audience,
and its meaning to the present viewer and
the audience today.
Because each of the items with which
we begin is a fragment of something larger,
the first task is to define the "whole" of
which the item is a part - the whole
poem, or painting, or church. But this
approach leads us to other wholes - the
whole oeuvre of the maker, or the whole
world of poems or paintings or churches
that defined the expectations of the maker
and the original audience, indeed the
whole cultural context against which it is a
performance.
Thus, to understand Vermeer we need
to understand something of the school of
Dutch painters who preceded him and
began to represent, as he did, the informal
interiors of bourgeois homes and the
ordinary lives of the people who lived
there, including the women.
To understand Dickinson, we need to
understand something of the sentimentalizing conventions governing 19th century
American verse, especially womens verse,
for only then will we see her resisting
some, using others, to make a verse that is
extraordinarily her own. In the poem I use,
for example, the comfortable way "Death"
is represented at the beginning, as a kindly
gentleman neutralized by his companion
"Immortality," is consistent with the
tendencies of her day, but the poem
reverses these, and ends with great
bleakness, converting "Immortality," with
all of its promise of heaven, into "Eternity,"
something very different indeed.

She begins:

Because I could not stop for Death He kindly stopped for me The Carriage held but just Ourselves And Immortality.
But she turns the tables by concluding:

Since then - 'tis Centuries - and yet
Feels shorter than the Day
I first surmised the Horses' Heads
Were toward Eternity Much the same is true of le Corbusier,
for his church, which seems so odd at first,
like nothing one has ever seen - on the
outside like a sculpted haystack, on the
inside dark and disorienting - turns out,
as we work our way into it, to have the
same basic architectural form as other
churches. Initial strangeness proves familiar
and illuminating. But neither part of the
experience, neither the strangeness nor the
familiarity, would be available to one who
did not know what to expect of the design
of the church in this culture.
Humanistic study thus involves
attunement to the culture and context
against which the work in question is a
performance. Like travel to a different
country, the experience of this attunement
changes our own imagination, and we
return to our own world with different
eyes. It is, in fact, part of the point of such
work to expose and thus subject to the
possibility of criticism some of our own
unconscious presuppositions and attitudes.
The meaning of a work of the kind we
are discussing is thus fundamentally
experiential in kind: the surprise into
familiarity that Le Corbusiers church at
Ronchamp offers, for example, or the
despair enacted in the shift from
"Immortality" to "Eternity," or the
frustration of asking questions about the
Vermeer painting that it will never answer.
The experience is never complete; it is not
the same for everyone; and to work our
way into it is an activity that changes our
own mind and imagination.
To summarize, then, we can say that the
work of the humanities is about artifacts
and texts from other cultures and times;
that it is about their meaning, as fully
understood as possible; that this meaning
requires an understanding of the context
against which the original work is a
performance; that this meaning cannot be
fully restated, both because of the gap
between one culture and another and
because of the gap between different parts
of the self.

What connection can there be between
this set of activities and the law?
It may seem at first none at all: The law
is, after all, the bureaucratic arm of a
bureaucratic state; it is about consequences
or results in the real world, not about texts
or language or the world of the
imagination; it is about power, not beauty
or truth. It is very often seen as a branch of
public policy, in which ligal questions are
collapsed into questions of social science or
political preference. More familiarly,
perhaps, law is often seen simply as a set of
rules, to be obeyed or disobeyed. Of
course, the law can be imagined,
sometimes usefully, in each of these ways,
especially when viewed from the outside.
But when it is viewed from the inside, by
someone who lives on its terms, it can be
seen as a field of life and practice, as a set
of intellectual and imaginative activities,
and, as such, far closer to the humanities
than we normally imagine.
To take one crucial aspect of their work,
lawyers, like humanists, are constantly
concerned with the understanding and
interpretation of texts that are made by
others, in other cultural circumstances, and
usually in the past; and the lawyers'
interest is always in what these texts mean,
or should be said to mean. Consider, for
example, the passage from Brown v. Board of
Education, to which I alluded earlier:
"We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,
we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reasons of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment."
Like the examples given earlier, this is a
fragment of a larger text, and the lawyers
first task is to locate it in the larger whole
of which it is a part. In this case, the
meaning of the phrase "in the field of
education" raises serious questions: Does
the Court mean to limit its holding to
public education, permitting segregation in
restrooms, parks, and swimming pools, for
example? Or is the educational aspect of
this case really an accident? Or is there
some other explanation for this language?
Such questions will carry us both to the
rest of the opinion and beyond it, to its
larger context.
In law as in the humanities, the relevant
"whole" thus expands to include not
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merely the single work of which a passage
is a pan, but the range of contexts against
which it is a performance, here including
earlier cases relied on as authority for
segregation by race, like the infamous
Plessy v. Ferguson; cases that cut the other
way, like Sweatt v. Painter, which insisted
that "equality" meant full educational
equality and not simply equal equipment
or facilities; the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself; the debates about its
adoption; the history giving rise to it; and
contemporaneous debates in the public
arena about states' rights and about the
evils of segregation.
Like the poem, the church, and the
painting, the opinion can only be read as a
response to its preexisting world, against
which it is a performance. This means, in
tum, that the meaning of the opinion is,
despite appearances, not essentially
propositional but experiential in kind: It is
performance against a background, and
understanding the opinion requires
attunement to that background.
The difficulties of reading a case in its
original context are greatly increased when
we try to translate the meaning we are
beginning to understand into the present,
and thus into a world different not only
from that of the case itself, but from any
that was then imagined. What does Brown
mean today? The promise it held out, of an
integrated society within a single
generation, and an end to racial hatred and
contempt, can now be seen as a hollow
one. Of course, many African American
students do go to integrated schools, and
to integrated colleges, but it cannot be
denied that a great many schools are
effectively segregated, not in the first
instance by law but by residential patterns.
Furthermore, there are those who want
schools that will focus upon African
American culture, seeking to instill pride
and discipline - a kind of proposed selfsegregation on the grounds of better
education - which complicates the basic
premise of Brown, that integration is an
inherently good thing.
The question of present meaning that
probably has the most bite at the moment
is that of affirmative action: Is the promise
of Brown fulfilled merely by forbidding the
state to segregate by law, or does it require
- or at least permit - affirmative state
action to end the patterns of racial
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<!/Jhe main point remains,
which is that in both the law
and the humanities we are
struggling with problems of
meaning, of cultural
difference, of the authority
of different languages.
dominance and abuse that have
characterized American society nearly from
the beginning? Or does Browns hostility
toward racial segregation support the view
that the state should be prohibited from
drawing racial lines, even those that benefit
the minority? These are questions Brown
raises but does not answer; in finding or
making answers to them, the law will seek
simultaneously to be true to Brown and,
of necessity, to give it new meaning in a
new world.
When we look back to Brown and ask
what it means for the present, it is not
enough, then, for us to try to understand
this gesture in the context in which it
occurred; we must translate it from one
world to another world, and, in translating,
change its meaning.
To generalize quickly from this all too
brief summary, it is evident that, like the
humanities, the law takes as its subject
texts or artifacts made by others, in other
cultural circumstances, and in some way in
the past; that the law is concerned with
their meaning, in the first instance to the
lawmakers and the world they addressed,
in the second instance to "us," that is, the
present world; that this meaning is
fundamentally performative and
experiential in kind, inhering in a
performance against a context; that this
meaning cannot be reflected without
distortion in our world and language; that
its meaning to "us" is therefore a translation
that entails a transformation, carried on
under simultaneous and opposed fidelities
to the original and to the world into which
it is carried. The reading of texts in the law
is thus an an in many ways like the an of
reading humanistic texts.
Of course, there is more to say on this
subject, for the law has its own constraints
and its own significances. But the most
notable distinction - the fact that it is an
exercise of official power - does not much

affect what I say, except to make it even
more important that the process of thought
and imagination by which legal texts are
read be sensible, wise, and good. The main
point remains, which is that in both the
law and the humanities we are struggling
with problems of meaning, of cultural
difference, of the authority of different
languages. One of my deepest beliefs is that
to read the work of a mind engaged with
one form of this struggle may help us to
understand a mind engaged in another,
and help us confront our own languages,
uncertainties, and translations as well. As
lawyers, we have much to learn from the
efforts of others in other forms; and
perhaps it works the other way, too that is, painters, poets, and architects have
something to learn from their sister
discipline, the law.
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